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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Vincent Stewart pied guilty to one count of felony
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine.
sentence of seven years, with three years fixed.

He received a unified

The district court initially placed

Mr. Stewart on probation, a condition of which was to complete mental health court;
however, he was found to have violated his probation some time later, and the district
court revoked and reinstated his probation.
motion for probation violation.

Several

later, the State filed a

The district court then held a hearing during which it

Mr. Stewart's probation;

Mr. Stewart was not present at the hearing

and did not waive his right to be present.
On appeal, Mr. Stewart asserts that the district court deprived him of his right to
due process by revoking his probation at a hearing held in his absence. Mr. Stewart
further contends that the district court abused its discretion in revoking his probation,
and in failing to reduce his sentence, sua sponte. 1
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's argument that due process
did not require Mr. Stewart to be present at his probation revocation hearing and the
State's argument that Mr. Stewart cannot raise the issue of whether the district court
abused its discretion when it failed to reduce his sentence sua sponte upon revoking
probation because this issue does not constitute fundamental error.

1

The issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in revoking Mr. Stewart's
probation was thoroughly briefed in Mr. Stewart's Appellant's Brief and will not be
addressed further herein.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts

course of oroceE~dings were previously articulated

in Mr. Stewart's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUES

1.

Did the district court violate
Stewart's right to
Mr. Stewart's probation in his absence?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Stewart's
probation?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce
sentence, sua sponte, upon revoking his probation?

3

it

r. Stewart's

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Violated Mr. Stewart's Rights To Due Process When It Revoked His
Probation In His Absence
The State claims that the district court merely "amend[ed]" its disposition of
Mr. Stewart's probation violation and thus Mr. Stewart did not need to be transported to
the probation revocation hearing. (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) This is contradicted by the
record, as the district court previously entered an order revoking and reinstating
Mr. Stewart's probation, but several weeks after probation was ordered the prosecutor
filed a motion to revoke Mr. Stewart's probation.

(R., pp.119-1

admitted that the prosecutor filed a motion to revoke

) Even where the
Stewart's probation, it

still claims that the district court merely "amended" the order to revoke Mr. Stewart's
probation.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-10.) This position is untenable.

Although the

district court may have called the probation violation hearing a "Review Hearing," such
does not alter the nature and effect of the hearing. During the hearing, the district court
treated the motion as a new violation-it heard from counsel that Mr. Stewart was not
re-admitted into mental health court, found Mr. Stewart could not perform the condition
of probation that required him to participate in mental health court, and revoked his
probation in his absence.

(See generally 4/19/14 Tr.)

Thus it was not simply a

ministerial hearing during which the district court amended its order to correct a clerical
error, but was in fact a hearing at which the district court found that Mr. Stewart was
unable to complete probation as ordered, and revoked his probation. The district court
found that Mr. Stewart could not complete a condition of his probation, yet Mr. Stewart
was apparently never arraigned on the violation, nor did he admit or deny violating his

4

. The district court found, without hearing testimony

to

a

violation, that Mr. Stewart was unable to complete a condition of his probation by being
denied re-entry into mental health court. (R., pp.132-134; 4/19/13 Tr., p.19, L:1 - p.21,
L.10.) The district court immediately went on to revoke his probation in his absence.
(4/19/13 Tr., p.1

L.1 -p.21, L.10.)

In its Brief, the State concedes that, should this Court find that Mr. Stewart's
inability to be placed back into mental health court was a separate probation violation,
the standard due process protections were not satisfied. (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) As
the State itself filed a petition for probation violation in order to instigate the hearing
(R., pp.120-123), it is illogical for the State to now say it was not a
violation.

probation

Further, the State's claim that Mr. Stewart made no reasoned argument to

explain how he was deprived of meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard on
whether he violated his probation is specious at best. As the hearing was misidentified
by the district court as a "Review Hearing," Mr. Stewart was not arraigned on the
allegations, and he was certainly not notified that, at the "Review Hearing," he would be
found in violation of his probation and such probation revoked, particularly where the
State had just filed a document that advised Mr. Stewart that he was entitled to be
present for a hearing on whether he violated the terms and conditions of his probation.
(R., pp.120-121.) Further, there was no opportunity to be heard, as the district court
denied his motion to be transported, and he was not present to respond to the
allegations or present his reasons why probation should or should not be revokedclearly he could not be heard if he was not transported to the courtroom for the hearing.

5

did the

of his counsel at the hearing satisfy Mr. Stewart's right to due

In its Brief, the State cites State v. Oyler, 92 Idaho 43 (1968), for the proposition
that a judge has discretion to revoke probation should the district court determine that a
probationer could not possibly perform a fundamental condition of his probation.
(Respondent's Brief, p.11.) However, even in Oyler the probationer received a hearing
at which he testified. Id. at 45, 47. Ultimately, the Idaho Supreme Court remanded the
case so that the district court could conduct a hearing as to whether Oyler's alcoholism
made it impossible for him to perform a condition of his probation-abstention from
consumption of alcohol. Id. at 47. At the hearing, the district court would

required to

find whether compliance with the condition of probation was fundamental to a proper
probation for Oyler. Id. If so, the district court could then reconsider whether he was a
fit subject for probation. Id. Mr. Stewart is entitled to a similar process.

The district court violated Mr. Stewart's right to due process when it found he was
unable to fulfill a condition of his probation and revoked his probation outside his
presence. Because doing so was a violation of Mr. Stewart's constitutional rights and
contravened Idaho case law, Idaho statutes, and I.C.R. 33(e), 2 the order revoking his

2

Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e) states:
The court shall not revoke probation except after a hearing at which the
defendant shall be present and apprised of the ground on which such
action is proposed ... The court shall not revoke probation unless there is
an admission by the defendant or a finding by the court, following a
hearing, that the defendant willfully violated a condition of probation.

Id. (emphasis added).
6

must

vacated, with the case remanded for a new hearing at which

will be

111.
The District Court, VVhen It Revoked Mr. Stewart's Probation, Abused Its Discretion By
Executing His Underlying Sentence Without Any Reduction
The State claims that Mr. Stewart did not preserve his claim that the district court
abused its discretion when it failed to reduce his sentence, sua sponte, upon revoking
his probation. (Respondent's Brief, p.12.) The State thus claims that Mr. Stewart is
precluded from appellate review of this issue, as he cannot meet his burden to show a
constitutional violation under the fundamental error doctrine.

(Respondent's

p.12.)
While Mr. Stewart acknowledges that he did not object to the district court's
failure to reduce his sentence upon revoking his probation, Mr. Stewart asserts that his
appellate challenge to the district court's failure to reduce his sentence sua sponte is not
subject to the fundamental error test because every time a court either revokes
probation or relinquishes jurisdiction it affirmatively, even if not expressly, makes a
ruling as to the length of a defendant's sentence. 3 Further, when a district court makes
an affirmative ruling, that ruling can be challenged on appeal. McPheters v. Maile, 138
Idaho 391, 397 (2003) ("To properly raise an issue on appeal there must either be an

Mr. Stewart recognizes that the Idaho Court of Appeals recently issued an Opinion in
State v. Clontz, 2014 Published Opinion No.44 (Idaho App. May 22, 2014), wherein it
held that a defendant cannot raise the issue of whether a district court abused its
discretion when it failed to reduce a sentence sua sponte on appeal because such an
appellate challenge is controlled by the Idaho Supreme Court's fundamental error test.
However, the decision in Clontz is not yet final.
3

7

ruling by the court
an

cannot

raised

or the issue must have been
the first time on

in the court

").

Support for this position can be found in State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673 (Ct. App.
2005), where the Idaho Court of Appeals held as follows:
At the end of the period of retained jurisdiction, the court may suspend the
sentence and place the defendant on probation, or may relinquish
jurisdiction, allowing execution of the original sentence. If jurisdiction is
relinquished, the court may also reduce the sentence at that time. It is a
common practice for a trial court to impose a rather severe underlying
sentence as an incentive for the defendant to perform well in the retained
jurisdiction program and to comply with the probation terms if the
defendant is ultimately placed on probation. A lengthy underlying sentence
also preserves the judge's options until such time as probation may be
denied or revoked, when the court can decide whether the sentence
should be reduced. A long underlying
thus provides the judge a
hedge against the uncertainty of the defendant's future performance.

Id. at 676 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). When a district court revokes probation
it must affirmatively decide whether or not to reduce the sentence. Even if this decision
is not expressly articulated on the record, it is a decision which must be made by the
court and, in the event the sentence is not reduced, it constitutes an adverse ruling by
the district court which can be addressed on appeal.
Further support for this position can be found in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053
(Ct. App. 1989), where the Court of Appeals held that:
In any probation revocation proceeding, the judge faces three potential
issues. First, was a condition of probation actually violated? Ordinarily, this
is a question of fact. Second, does the violation justify revoking the
probation? This is a question addressed to the judge's sound discretion.
Third, and finally, if probation is revoked, what prison sentence should be
ordered? Specifically, if a prison sentence previously has been
pronounced but suspended, should that sentence be ordered into
execution or should the court order a reduced sentence as authorized by
I.C.R. 35? This question, too, is one of discretion. In a given case, the
parties may frame any one or all of these issues for the judge's
consideration.

8

Id.

1054. Thus, just as with the relinquishment of jurisdiction, after a district court

revokes probation, it must decide whether to execute the underlying sentence or reduce
it pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, and this is a ruling that can be challenged on
appeal absent an affirmative request for a sentence reduction.
In sum, when the district court executed Mr. Stewart's underlying sentence
without a reduction after revoking probation, it ruled adversely to Mr. Stewart, and due
to that adverse ruling, Mr. Stewart was not required to object to the length of his
sentence at the revocation hearing in order to preserve a sentencing issue on appeal. 4

CONCLUSION
Mr. Stewart respectfully requests that this Court remand this case with an order
that Mr. Stewart be placed back on probation. Alternatively, he requests that his case
be remanded to the district court for a hearing at which Mr. Stewart would be present.
DATED this 24 th day of June, 2014.

\ \ )cl)
SALLY)!co6LEY
/
Deputy State AppellaterPublic Defender

Further, where Mr. Stewart was not present at the disposition hearing at which his
probation was revoked, he did not have the opportunity to object or ask for a sentence
reduction at the disposition hearing.

4
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